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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID WHYTE, DAVID B. WHYTE, 
DAN E. WHYTE, and TERRY WHYTE, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents. 
vs. 
DERL CHRISTENSEN, and 
MRS. DERL CHRISTENSEN, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Case No. 14151 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action by respondents David Whvte, David 
B, Whyte, Dan E. Whyte, and Terry Whyte for wages for labor 
performed by them in the construction of an addition to 
appellants1 home. A Second Cause of Action was alleged by the 
respondents but was not pursued and no evidence was introduced 
in support of it. 
Appellants counterclaimed against respondent David 
Whyte for any amount found to be due laborers or materialmen, 
claiming payment by appellants to respondent David VJhyte of 
the full contract price. 
Appellants further claimed damages from respondent 
David Whyte for his failure to perform the work done upon 
appellants1 home in a workmanlike manner. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before a jury in the District 
Court of Salt Lake County before the Honorable Marcellus K. 
Snow, The jury returned a verdict and found: 
1. That respondent David Whyte was hired by the 
appellants Christensen as a mere employee at an hourly wage 
rate and not as a contractor and awarded judgment to the 
respondents, and 
2. That respondent David Whyte substantially com-
pleted the remodeling work he agreed to do and that all work 
done by him was done in a workmanlike manner and found no 
cause of action on the appellants' counterclaim. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondents seek an affirmance of the judgment 
entered by the trial court and costs of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents basically agree with appellants1 Statement 
of Facts with certain clarification and modification as set 
forth in the Argument. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANTS' MOTIOM FOR A 
DIRECT VERDICT AT THE CLOSE OF RESPONDENTS' EVIDENCE, 
The appellants assert that respondent David Whyte was 
acting as a general contractor without a contractor's license. 
I refer the Court to Section 58-23-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended, which provides that it is unlawful for a person to 
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act in the capacity of a contractor unless ne is ixv.v4.. 
then provides that (1) The securing of any construction or 
building permit, or (2) The employment of any person on a con-
struction project, or (3) The offering of any bid to do the 
work of a contractor shall be evidence of a person acting in 
the capacity of a contractor. If we examine the evidence in 
the principal case, we find that David Whyte did not meet any 
one of these requirements. 
Whyte told Christensen that he must obtain a building 
permit and Christensen then went down and obtained the permit 
himself, and when Christensen obtained the building permit, he 
obtained it in the name of builder-owner, and Christensen 
testified that he was a self-builder. (R. 143) Christensen 
also testified that at no time did he ask Whyte to take out a 
building permit, because he knew that Whyte did not have a 
contractor's license. (R. 143) When the building was ready 
for inspection, Mrs. Christensen called the building inspector 
and had him come out and inspect it, (R. 186-187) 
The respondent did not employ or hire any individual 
as an employee to work on the job. Whyte1s three sons, worked 
with him, but they were also employees of Christensen, for at 
the time the construction was discussed, Whyte mentioned this 
to Christensen and Christensen agreed to it. (R. 9, 129, 186) 
Christensen told Whyte that he did not know of any specialist 
and asked if Whyte would obtain them when needed. Whyte did 
contact the other craftsmen, but each time told them to see 
Christensen, and he would give them the directions as to the 
work he wanted done. Whyte never gave any directions to the 
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other craftsmen nor was he present at any time they were work-
ing on the job. This was true in the case of the electrician 
(R. 16, 94), the heating man (R. 15, 78) and the plumber (R. 14, 
104), and, in fact, with the plumber Whyte did not know him 
personally but just happened to contact him by phone at the 
supply house. (R. 14) 
There is certainly not any evidence that a firm bid 
was given by Whyte to do the construction job. Christensen 
asked Whyte to give him a rough idea of how much it would cost 
to build the addition and Whyte told him it would cost approxi-
mately $6,000 plus the electrical work. (R. 8) While both 
appellants testified that Whyte never stated an amount, they 
said on a paper he had the figure of $5,500.00. (R. 127, 189, 
190) 
Numerous times during the construction period, addi-
tional work was done by Whyte at the direction of Christensen, 
such as the pouring of the garage floor and the patio, and 
changing a wall. (R. 28, 27, 37, 38) Christensen made changes 
in the work of the other craftsmen, and also had them do addi-
tional work which was not discussed originally between Whyte 
and Christensen. (R. 150, 154, 155, 78, 94, 105) Christensen 
also furnished certain materials, such as a storm doer, bathroom 
accessories, and siding, which he would not have been required 
to do if it had been a firm contract. (R. 23, 24, 35, 150, 131, 
181) Mrs. Christensen also worked on the job and so did Jerry, 
Mr. Christensen1s brother-in-law, and if they had had a firm 
contract, then there would have been no reason to have these 
individuals work on the job. (R. 22, 23, 194) 
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Appellants also refer to Section 58-23-3(3) which 
defines a contractor, and which provides that any person who 
for a fixed sum, price, fee, percentage or other compensation 
other than wages, undertakes with another person for the con-
struction of a building, is a contractor. Again I refer the 
Court to the language of the legislature that it must be for a 
set sum. If it is for wages, then he is not a general contrac-
tor, and both the appellant (R. 9) and the respondent (R. 129) 
knew and testified that Whyte was working for wages. The only 
dispute was as to the exact amount of the wages. (R. 14 2, 143) 
I refer the Court to the testimony given by Christen-
sen on direct examination as found on pages 128 and 129 of the 
Record. 
Q (By Mr. Blackham) Did you have any discus-
sion v/ith Mr. Whyte, concerning what his charges 
for labor would be on this remodeling project? 
A He told us the charge that he would charge 
us would be, roughly, the same as what he made at 
the Post Office. 
Q And was any dollar-amount given as to 
what his charges would be? 
A Well, I knew, roughly, what his pay step 
was at the Post Office. 
Q But would the figure of $7.00 per hour— 
was this discussed? 
A No. 
Q And what was your understanding of what 
the amount that Mr. Whyte would be charging for 
his labor? 
A Just what he made at the Post Office, an 
hour. 
Q And did you have knowledge of what that 
amount would have been, then, in May of 1973? 
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A Yes. 
Q And what would that amount have boon? 
A Between five and six dollars, at that 
time. 
Q Is that for what period of time? 
A That was back in f73. 
Q I know; be five or six dollars, per day, 
or what? 
A Per hour. 
Q Per hour. What was your rate of pay at 
the Post Office, at that time, Mr. Christensen? 
A 5.65, an hour. 
Q And did Mr. Whyte earn more at the Post 
Office, at that time, than you did? 
A Yes, he did. 
In the Utah case of Thorley v. Kolob Fish and Game 
Club, 13 Utah 2d 294, 373 P.2d 574, the appellant contended the 
respondent could not recover because he was an unlicensed con-
tractor. The Court held a test to determine whether the rela-
tionship was that of an independent contractor or that of an 
employer and employee is the right of control- Throughout the 
course of construction Christensen continually exercised control 
over the job. He told Whyte that they would arrange for the 
cement and when it would be there. Whyte attempted to get some 
new siding to put on the home, and Christensen told him no, that 
he would find the old in the spring when the snow melts and put 
it on. Christensen would not allow Whyte to buy a new storm 
door but got one himself and also got other accessories and also 
exercised control over the work performed by the other craftsmen 
and told them how he wanted it done and made many changes from 
the original discussion. 
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POINT II 
THE DECISION OF THE JURY WAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EVIDENCE. 
The Court is well aware of the rule of review as set 
forth in the case of Charlton v. Hackett, 11 Utah 2d 389, 
360 P.2d 176. (See also Lowe v. Rosenlof, 12 Utah 2d 190, 
364 P.2d 418.) 
In considering the attack on 
the findings and judgment of the trial 
court it is our duty to follow these 
cardinal rules of review: to indulge 
them a presumption of validity and 
correctness; to require the appellant 
to sustain the burden of showing error; 
to review the record in the liaht most 
favorable to them; and not to disturb 
them if they find substantial support 
in the evidence. 
Both the appellant and the respondent were full-time 
employees of the United States Post Office and saw each other 
daily. Whyte had had some experience as a builder and Christen-
sen was desirous of having some remodeling done on his home. 
Christensen had not had building experience and did not know 
any craftsmen, so Whyte suggested various craftsmen to Christen-
sen and had them contact him direct and he gave them directions 
as to what work should be done. Whyte also had a knowledge as 
to what material was needed in the construction and had an 
account with Anderson Lumber Company where he was able to get a 
10 percent discount, and to save his friend money, said that he 
would charge the material in his name and Christensen could 
then pay him (P. 12,. 13, 143, 150), being a loose relationship 
between friends, with Christensen wanting to get the work done 
as inexpensively as possible. I refer the Court to the dis-
cussion set forth in Point I as to the further relationship be-
tween the two. 
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POINT III 
INSTRUCTION NO. 5 REPRESENTS THE LAW IN THE STATE OF UTAH. 
Instruction No. 5 was neither confusing to the jury 
nor prejudicial to the appellants. 
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Thorley v. 
KoJLofc), supra, held, 
An important test to determine 
whether the relation is that of an 
independent contractor or that of an 
employer and employee is the right 
of control. The right to end the 
services whenever the party sees fit 
is also an important test. 
The Utah Code Annotated, Section 58-23-3(3) defines 
a contractor as one who is working for other than wages. 
Respondents submit that there is no unclarity or con-
fusion in Instruction No. 5, but looking at it in the light 
most favorable to appellants, alleges that appellants failed 
to read the Instruction as a whole. The appellants in their 
argument have taken Instruction No. 5 out of context without 
relating it to the other Instructions given by the Court. The 
Court in Instruction No. 25, specifically instructed the jury 
that they are to consider all the Instructions as a whole and 
to regard each in the light of all the others. Instructions 
Nos. 4, 9, 10 and 11 clarify and exemplify Instruction No. 5, 
and when read as a whole could leave no doubt in the minds of 
the jury what the meaning and intent of Instruction No. 5 was. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should uphold the trial court and find the 
evidence is sufficient to affirm the judgment in favor of 
-8-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
respondents and against appellants. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Homer F. Wilkinson 
Attorney for Plaintiffs and 
Respondents 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
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Defendants-Appellants, at 3535 South 3200 West, Salt Lake 
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